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By Editorial 
 
Abstract. This book deals with the accumulation of government debt in twenty-two of the 
richest countries of the world, which has been ongoing since about the mid-1970s. All these 
countries are welfare states with a large government sector that provides services and 
transfers purchasing power to the perceived needy, although some countries are more 
ambitious in this respect than others. The build-up of debt is due to maintaining welfare 
expenditures beyond what tax revenues allow. But indefinite debt accumulation is not an 
option. The question is whether the governing elites in democratic countries will shrink 
from doing what is necessary in fear of losing their electorate, in the end opening the way 
to unenlightened populists and potential usurpers. 
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Book Review 
hapter One traces the development of government debt for these countries 
since the Second World War or shortly thereafter. The countries involved 
are the long-standing members of the OECD, which comprise most of the 
richest countries of the world and those that have the oldest and most developed 
welfare states. Countries that were actively engaged in the war built down their 
debt gradually during the first decades after the war. From the mid-1970s most 
countries began to accumulate debt; in some countries this process began earlier 
and in some a bit later. 
In many countries this process has continued relentlessly, with the debt level 
reaching world war proportions, while some countries have managed to reverse the 
accumulation of debt. It is noteworthy that the latter countries are relatively small. 
Perhaps lenders lose confidence in small countries’ ability to pay earlier than they 
do for large countries. The difference between government borrowing and 
individual borrowing (or borrowing by firms) is less than Keynesian thinking 
would have us believe; lenders are unwilling to lend to countries they do not 
believe will be able to pay them back or which will inflate their way out of their 
obligations. 
Chapter Two discusses why government debt has risen. Prior to the energy 
crisis in 1973 economic growth was rapid in almost all countries, which enabled 
them to increase public expenditure and consumption rapidly. The recession that 
followed in the wake of the energy crisis was generally seen as temporary, and 
most governments tried, in a traditional Keynesian way, to bridge the gap caused 
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by the recession. But it turned out to be of longer duration than expected, and 
economic growth did not quite revert to the previous golden age in most countries. 
Thus began the accumulation of government debt, of which we have not yet seen 
the end in many countries. 
Trivially, rising government debt is due to expenditures outpacing revenues, but 
is it due to a too high level of ambition for welfare transfers and public 
consumption, or is it due to inability to raise tax revenue? There is little or no 
correlation between GDP per capita, public consumption (as percent of GDP), or 
public expenditure (also in percent of GDP) and government debt (as percent of 
GDP), which suggests that a large debt is due to inability to raise taxes to pay for 
whatever expenditure a country has rather than a high level of public expenditure 
or consumption. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the public sector has expanded because of the 
rise of the welfare state. There is, however, no law of nature that says that 
governments must provide an ever increasing amount of services or transfers; the 
fact that this has happened must be sought in the political sphere. Among the 
political factors behind the rise of the welfare state is the rise of the labor 
movement and the extension of the right to vote. The labor movement and 
associated political parties saw universal health and educational benefits as well as 
various social transfers as in their interest. Furthermore, the scarcity of labor 
caused by the Second World War and post-war economic growth strengthened the 
political power of labor. Finally, the rapid post-war economic growth made it easy 
to expand public services and transfers because private consumption could expand 
simultaneously. 
But there are also structural reasons behind the expansion of the public sector. 
These are known as “the cost disease model,” which is based on the premise that 
technological progress is more rapid in manufacturing than in the provision of 
public services such as education and health services. If both manufacturing and 
public services are to expand at the same rate, more and more of people’s incomes 
must be diverted to taxes to pay for public services. There are limits to how far this 
development can proceed, obvious in principle but less easily pinned down in 
practice. There is no other solution to this other than increased privatization of such 
services, which is indeed happening. The expansion of the public sector has largely 
come to a halt in most rich countries, but a gap between welfare ambitions and 
reluctance to pay for them is indeed likely to be one cause behind the build-up of 
government debt. It is noted that some of the economic growth in the decades after 
the Second World War was due to the transfer of services from the informal 
household economy to the formal part of the economy where people (mostly 
women) are paid for taking care of children and the aged in specialized institutions 
instead of at home. 
No society entirely abandons the weak; indeed we are genetically programmed 
to care of our young, who otherwise would perish. But whom we take care of and 
how well depends on what we can afford; poor, primitive societies have abandoned 
their old and infirm. Our immense wealth has made the welfare state possible, and 
in the heyday of economic growth it grew rapidly. But has it, perhaps, been taken 
too far? The ability to pay for public services and government transfers depends on 
the productivity of the private economy; how much people are willing to work and 
invest in better technology. Taxes, whatever they are used for, weaken the private 
incentives to work and to invest. Have we gone too far? Chapter Four discusses the 
welfare state, its development and rationale. Even if Bismarck is credited with 
initiating the beginnings of the first welfare state its growth is undoubtedly due to 
the rise of democratic government responsive to demands from citizens and 
spreading the wealth of industrial nations more widely. Satisfying those demands 
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without raising revenues commensurately leads to government deficits, which 
indeed is what has happened. 
Will democratic governments be able to deal with the debt trap? How good is 
democracy anyway, compared to enlightened authoritarianism? This is discussed in 
Chapter Five. The modern form of democracy bears only a superficial resemblance 
to the democracy practiced in the ancient Greek city states. The modern state is a 
much too complicated entity to be ruled by general assemblies or referenda. It can 
only be governed by specialized elites and a cadre of civil servants. The fact that 
the governing elite is selected by common vote is what confers the name of 
democracy on this system, but that selection process leaves much to be desired. 
Modern democracy works well when there are competing and competent elites 
that respect each other and the rule of law, when there are informative mass media 
free of the elites, and when there is an independent judiciary. But will the 
established elites be able to deal with the challenges rising out of debt 
accumulation and economic stagnation? There is reason to fear they will be thrown 
out of office, not necessarily for being incompetent but for not having delivered 
what the electorate expected and was perhaps promised. Will they be replaced by 
unenlightened populists or usurpers? That is what happened eighty years ago in 
Germany as a result of economic chaos and frustrated expectations. Human nature 
and judgment has not undergone a revolutionary change for the better in the 
meantime. 
Is democracy essential for economic progress and general welfare? The rise of 
the modern industrial world began with the industrial revolution. Some have traced 
the roots of the modern industrial state to the Glorious Revolution when William of 
Orange agreed to share his power with the English parliament. But at that time, and 
for a long while afterwards, only a small minority (of the order of 5 percent of the 
relevant age groups) had the right to vote. But it was a decisive minority, one that 
identified its interests with trade and industry and so, by promoting its own 
interests, also promoted industrial development and trade. Successive extensions of 
the right to vote have undoubtedly spread wealth wider, but does it perhaps contain 
the seeds of its own destruction? In many rich countries the majority of the 
electorate gets its income from the state, either as public employees or recipients of 
transfers such as pensions and disability payments. Will this majority see its 
interests best served by taxing the market sector of the economy for its own benefit 
and undermine the source of its own wherewithal? Without a vibrant market-
oriented sector the welfare state will wither. 
There is less difference between an enlightened authoritarianism and modern 
democracy than many people are willing to admit. No modern country can be 
governed without a specialized governing elite. The economic “miracles” we have 
seen in recent decades, primarily in East Asia, all began under enlightened 
authoritarian governments, some of which are still that way. While unenlightened 
authoritarian states are numerous and well known, failed democracies also are 
unfortunate facts of history. The score card of democracy is less clear than many 
people would like to believe. While democracy superficially would seem to 
promote the interests of the general public, in fact it is prone to promote special 
interests that are concentrated enough for people to use their time and resources to 
lobby governments. 
The debt problems of some European Union countries using the euro as 
currency have been particularly acute and caught much attention. The euro 
arrangement is discussed briefly in Chapter Six. Going back to the pre-euro 
inflationary circus will not be easy. The countries of southern Europe which 
adopted the euro did so precisely to break out of that inflationary spiral and avoid 
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repetitive devaluations which were hard to reconcile with free capital movements 
across inter-EU boundaries. 
Some rich democratic countries have succeeded in reversing the build-up of 
government debt, although some of them have seen it rise again after the financial 
crisis of 2008. This gives us some hope that democratic countries will in fact be 
able to deal with the debt legacy. But it is unlikely to happen until a sense of an 
urgent crisis has gripped both policy makers and their electorate. This is in any 
case the lesson from Sweden, discussed in Chapter Seven. Sweden was one of the 
pioneers in building the welfare state, but by the 1970s it suffered from an 
increasing mismatch between rising welfare ambitions and retarded economic 
growth. This, and the sense that the post-1973 oil crisis recession was temporary, 
led to a rapid build-up of debt to an unsustainable level. It is noteworthy that 
parties across a wide political spectrum shared the outlook that Sweden could 
overcome its beginning difficulties by deficit financing, but when the resulting 
public debt approached an unsustainable level there emerged a similarly wide 
consensus about what needed to be done; curtailment in welfare expenditures and a 
reform of the pension system. A legacy of this consensus is that Sweden is now 
among the EU countries with the lowest debt to GDP ratio and one that did not 
increase after the financial crisis of 2008. 
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